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Abstract 
 
Recent developments in clinical, cognitive and behavioural sciences as well as in social 
neuroscience can provide new perspectives on our understanding of different forms of pain expression 
and the social reactions of observers to various types of pain expression.  Studies indicate that pain 
expression is governed by both automatic (unintentional, reflexive) and controlled (intentional, 
purposive) neuroregulatory systems.  Reciprocal mechanisms in observers responsible for automatic 
(unintentional, reflexive) and controlled (intentional, reflective) reactions also appear important.  
Observers appear more likely to display immediate “visceral”, emotional reactions to unintentional, 
reflexive expression, whereas controlled expression characterized by purposive behaviour appears more 
likely to elicit reflection on the nature and origins of the person’s pain.  This review summarizes 
research within the context of a theoretical model for understanding how pain is perceived in others.   
Perspective:  People attempting to understand another person’s pain may have access to the 
person’s spontaneous behavioural reaction as well as verbal report and other purposive communications.  
The former instigates reflexive and emotional reactions whereas the latter tends to be perceived as 
confounding expression of experience with response to situational demands.   
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Perceiving Pain in Others: Automatic and Controlled Mechanisms 
Recognizing and interpreting the significance of pain expression in others can be of great 
importance to the suffering person and the person witnessing the other’s distress.  Various actions, 
including language, paralinguistic vocalizations, facial expression, body posture, and escape or 
avoidance behaviour, may signal pain to others. These events can command the attention of observers 
from perspectives of both self-interest and social beneficence (and sometimes malevolence). They 
permit recognition of potential danger and provide opportunity for harm avoidance at the same time as 
they allow appreciation of what is happening to the person in pain, perhaps leading to provision of 
care
45, 41, 92
.  The adaptive value of responding to pain in others is embedded in the evolutionary history 
of humans and ancestral species
7, 27, 30,87,90
.   Despite its importance, the study of the social transaction 
initiated by pain expression is not well developed
80,82,91
 although it is fundamental for understanding 
pain assessment in research and clinical practice
83
. 
Recent developments in clinical, cognitive and behavioural sciences as well as in social 
neuroscience can provide new perspectives on our understanding of different forms of pain expression 
and the social reactions of observers.  Studies indicate that pain expression is governed by both 
automatic (unintentional, reflexive) and controlled (intentional, purposive) neuroregulatory systems
43
.  
Reciprocal mechanisms in observers responsible for automatic (unintentional, reflexive) and controlled 
(intentional, reflective) reactions also appear important.  This review summarizes research within a 
theoretical model of how pain is perceived in others.   
The Background 
Tapping into the pain experience of another through use of painful expression is a challenging 
task.  Expression can only partially represent the complexity of the subjective experience; hence, they 
are not equivalent
26, 43, 55, 56, 86
.  At the neurobiological level of analysis, different systems are associated 
with pain experience and expression.  Studies of sensory and affective features of pain experience have 
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focused upon afferent nociceptive and neuropathic mechanisms and central processing
15
, whereas 
investigations of pain expression necessitate examination of systems responsible for language and 
efferent neuromotor regulatory mechanisms
80,88
.    
Operationalizing the distinction between pain experience and expression poses problems.  From 
the research perspective, experience cannot be studied through other than some form of expression.  
Inevitably, understanding the pain experience of another requires inference.  One can identify various 
cues to be important for observer judgments in the behaviour of the person in pain (self-report, other 
features of vocalizations, facial activity, body activity, limb withdrawal, writhing, and other nonverbal 
behaviors).  Other evidence such as the presence of precipitants of injury
50,61
, actual bodily injury, and 
physiological response to tissue stress or pathology
5
 can also influence judgements.  However, the 
presence and experience of pain are often poorly related to the nature and magnitude of tissue stress or 
damage
11
.  The inferences and judgments of observers necessitate attention to the behavioural reactions 
of the person in pain.   
The primary resources available for examining the subjective experience of pain are self-report 
and nonverbal expression, categories of pain response that are readily differentiated and usually 
identified as conceptually different.  In tightly controlled studies, they can be highly correlated
55
; more 
typically they are only modestly correlated, with contextual factors determining the magnitude of the 
relationship
56, 70
.   
In competent, well-motivated people, self-report can provide a valid estimate of pain.  But the 
need for competence in cognitive functioning and the potential for biased responses reflecting sufferer 
expectations and needs cannot be ignored
51, 78
.  The individual’s perception of optimal performance and 
outcome in a given setting appears crucial and determines self-presentation.  Those assessing the person 
for pain also may bias self-report by providing cues as to what level of report is expected or appropriate.  
Thus, self-report must be recognized as representing some combination of expression of personal 
experience and a response to an appraisal of the immediate situation.   
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Nonverbal expression typically is endorsed as important when infants, young children, seniors 
with dementia, or others with communication limitations are unable to provide self-report
17, 46
.  
However, nonverbal assessment is also important in everyday and clinical social discourse.  Nonverbal 
expression typically adds context and meaning to language and can be perceived as more credible than 
self-report because it is not as subject to conscious control as the use of language
67
.  But similar to self-
report, nonverbal expression is not exclusively reflexive. It also confounds subjective experience and 
situational demands.  Nonverbal expression is sensitive to audiences
54, 69, 81,85
.  People also can be 
reasonably successful in suppressing or exaggerating nonverbal pain expression
26, 48, 44, 58
, in accordance 
with perception of situational demands, thereby again confounding spontaneous with socially predicated 
expression.  It is not surprising that observers, clinicians or otherwise, experience difficulties in 
determining whether either self-report or nonverbal behaviour represent manifestations of pain 
experience or reactions to self-serving or situational demand biases.   
We propose an alternative classification that distinguishes between automatic, reflexive features 
of the response to pain, perhaps best illustrated by the protective nociceptive flexion reflex
36, 9
, and 
expressions of pain that reflect higher levels of central processing or purposive, deliberative control.  
Automatic reactions, whether in response to pain or other life events, tend to be sufficiently transparent 
so as to signify their direct meaning, and include “screaming in pain, laughing with joy, and growling 
with anger”60, (p. 29). Controlled, intentional expression is typified by the use of language for self-report 
purposes but also would include integrated sequences of instrumental motor activity
43, 56
.  The 
distinction is important because observers are disposed to attributing causes to other persons’ actions47,  
59
.  Reflexive activity is considered to have quite different functional implications than activities that are 
suggestive of deliberate intention and executive control.  Complexity is added by the reality that 
although pain behaviour may be unintentional (e.g., facial expression, or even nociceptive pain reflexes), 
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it can be controllable to a certain extent (e.g., inhibiting facial expression, exaggerating withdrawal 
reactions, etc.)
52, 68, 71
. 
The distinction between systems that are automatic, on the one hand, or subject to processing and 
control, on the other, also characterizes observer reactions.  Witnessing others reacting to acute painful 
events is capable of instigating immediate “visceral” or gut level emotional experiences16.  The rapidly 
unfolding social neuroscience literature on cerebral correlates of witnessing others in painful distress 
documents the brain states to be observed
50,63, 73
.  These automatic, uncontrollable reactions are 
accompanied by immediate attention and parallel controlled reflective appraisal of the nature of the 
other person’s situation, as well as attention to likely sources of the activity observed, as the observer 
seeks to understand what is happening to the other person.   
The theoretical distinction between two major observable behavioural sources of information 
concerning another person’s pain experience and two major patterns of reacting to others in pain arises 
from theoretical and empirically derived models of information processing implicating at the extremes 
automatic and controlled mechanisms, with these interrelated and operative in varying degrees
62,34
.  The 
proposition that human performance results from an interplay between automatic and controlled 
processing of information
72
 is predicated upon the understanding that in complex environments attention 
must be guided to process critical stimuli, yet other routine, well rehearsed and overlearned activities are 
executed repetitively without demands on attention.  It has been applied to understanding social 
interaction phenomena in other contexts
77, 3
 including study of such phenomena as automatic stereotype 
activation
2, 12
   
The following elaborates on this distinction as it contributes to understanding how those 
experiencing pain react and how observers respond to different forms of pain display.   
Automatic and Controlled Features of the Behaviour of the Person in Pain 
Kenneth D. Craig 
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Systematic differences in the categories of painful expression set the occasion for variation in 
how observers perceive and respond to the person in pain.   
Unintentional expressions of painful experience.  Automatic pain manifestations are involuntary, 
spontaneous, triggered, stereotyped, predisposed sets of behavioural reactions elicited by noxious 
stimuli.  They accompany but do not wholly or exclusively represent the sensory, affective and cognitive 
features of pain.  From a physiological perspective, they are the somatomotor features of the coordinated 
central, hormonal, and autonomic response to tissue insult that have the relatively distinctive character 
of preparing the person to defend against tissue damage.   
In considering types of automatic behaviour it is useful to distinguish between observable actions 
that are directly protective, because they permit escape or avoidance of sources of pain, and those that 
are indirectly protective because they communicate distress to others, thereby eliciting their protective 
interventions
80
.  The former are represented by withdrawal reflexes and assuming guarded postures
53
. 
They act largely outside conscious awareness and deliberation.  Communicative actions can also be 
reflexive or automatic.  Infant behavioural reactions to painful events are reasonably seen as evolved 
protective behaviour, with control only emerging later on in infancy
23, 42, 60
.  During the earliest moments 
and months of life, some of the protective behaviour is primarily in the form of social communication, 
for example, crying or facial expression, thereby informing parents and other adults potentially able to 
intervene with sources of distress and/or danger
42
.  
Many communicative and other protective actions are reasonably construed as biologically 
prepared and unlearned.  In older children and adults, continuity and stereotypy in various 
manifestations of pain can be observed
23
.  Features of facial expression, paralinguistic qualities of 
speech, guarded behaviour and protective posture would appear to satisfy criteria for unintentional signs 
of pain, i.e., they are reflexive, display striking structural and functional consistency across the life span, 
the person largely is not aware of them, but they can be controlled to a certain extent.  Criteria for 
automatic actions, as defined by Moors & De Houwer
62
 include processing at a relatively non-conscious 
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level, efficiency in terms of not requiring effortful processing, absence of a formulated goal, and being 
purely stimulus driven   Concerning observable actions relevant to social communication, facial 
expression is typically the most salient and instructive for the observer
24, 70, 90
. A relatively stereotyped 
facial display of pain has been identified that is distinguishable from non-noxious emotional states, both 
behaviourally, in the judgments of others
74
 and in observer brain states documented through neuro-
imaging
73
, but other socially relevant actions may be identifiable, for example, cry and paralinguistic 
qualities of speech.   
Automatic responses are expected to be relatively stimulus driven and independent of attention 
and contextual influence
62
.  However, it is clear that emotional and cognitive factors may modify 
reflexive responses, for example, stress induced analgesia is capable of diminishing reflexive withdrawal 
responses in rats and humans
35
 and negative emotions can potentiate startle in humans
6
.  While facial 
expression is a candidate for relatively immediate responding without conscious attending to the display, 
it is context-sensitive and linked to environmental demands.  For example, presence of an audience of 
strangers tends to inhibit facial expression of pain
54
, although children who engage in high levels of 
catastrophizing appear to indiscriminately display pain and are less likely to suppress pain expression
86
.  
Furthermore, automatic responses are to some extent subject to voluntary control, for example, 
suppression
71
 or enhancement
48
.   As children mature, originally automatic manifestations of pain come 
at least partially under voluntary control.  For example, the essentially reflexive crying of the neonate 
becomes more of a speech act
25
 and children learn to suppress pain expression in the presence of peers 
when negative reactions are anticipated
58
. Control can be achieved over facial displays of pain
22
, 
including both exaggeration and suppression of the display; however, the exaggerated display differs 
from the genuine display in subtle ways
49
, and neither faking nor suppression of facial displays are 
wholly successful
44, 67
.   
Intentional expressions of painful experience.  These can be construed as typically deliberate, 
conscious, and coordinated by executive functions
1
.  The latter are implicated when complex cognitive 
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sub-processes such as planning, anticipation, and decision-making become engaged.  The use of 
language appears to best illustrate controlled expression of pain.   It is noteworthy that complex, 
coordinated or innovative responses to situational demands can come to be relatively automatic, in this 
instance enacted without deliberation, when thoroughly well rehearsed in particular situations
3, 62
.   
Understanding controlled expression would appear to be more important to understanding human 
pain expression, although continuity in controlled expression across primate species is evident
27
.  
Interaction between automatic reactions and controlled expressions would be expected, with the latter 
coming to modulate the former in the course of human ontogeny, but there are limits to the extent that 
automatic expressions can be over-ridden by conscious control.   
Automatic and Controlled Features of Perceiving Pain in Others 
Cues related to pain in another person have the potential to influence observer perception of pain, 
some as a result of automatic activation, with others acquiring meaning only through conscious 
deliberation and executive processing.   The act of perceiving others in pain has been characterized in a 
theoretical model of pain empathy as the product of both bottom-up and top-down variables
38, 39
.  
“Bottom-up” information is derived through perception of the actions of the person manifesting pain.  
The concept refers primarily to automatic reactions to the painful reactions of others and would 
implicate the detection of pain.  This is appraised and achieves significance for the observer through 
utilization of “top-down” information reflecting application of the beliefs, expectancies, attitudes and 
biases of the observer, a process characterized by greater levels of controlled processing..  
Automatic Reactions.   These are characterized as reflexive, intuitive, automatic “gut feelings” 
evoked by the pain reactions of others. These “visceral” reactions are reasonably construed as more 
ancient in their evolutionary origins, conserved across phyla by virtue of their functional advantages in 
warning, motivating and protecting progenitors, thereby increasing reproductive fitness.  There would 
appear to be automatic processing of cues through biologically prepared innate, unconditioned feature 
detectors that give rise to reflex-like responses.  Current brain imaging studies of biological reactivity 
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demonstrate a powerful and immediate biological impact of the experience of witnessing others in pain 
on observers
8, 28, 50, 63,73,76
.    
Reactions are influenced by contextual factors (e.g., setting and social cues, and characteristics 
of the person in pain
19,29, 40, 57
.  The relationship between the observer and the person in pain can dictate 
the reaction and perhaps commitment to the person in pain.  This is evident in both behavioural and 
brain imaging studies.  For example, judgements of pain in infants differ systematically across parents, 
nurses and pediatricians
65
 and the perceived fairness of others expressing pain were found to modulate 
empathic neural responses
75
.    
Automatic reaction patterns would not be restricted to reflexive or autonomic activation, but 
could include automatic instigation of thoughts, beliefs and biases.  Inherent sensitivity would appear to 
involve matching of stimulus input to prepared schema, thereby instigating unconditioned and 
coordinated reaction patterns. In turn these reactions would be amenable to conditioning and yield 
templates that guide automatic evaluation of perceived threat and reactions thereafter
4, 10, 64, 84
. 
Controlled processing.  When an observer attends to another person’s plight, automatic reactions 
would be accompanied by efforts to understand and plan actions suitable to the situation
77
. There is a 
need to know not only what is happening to the individual but also why this is happening, what 
sequence of events led to the person’s painful distress, and what the person could do, or what the 
observer could do to resolve the situation.  Problem-solving, memory, judgment, attitudes and biases are 
likely to be implicated.  This higher level of neuroregulatory information processing would implicate 
executive functions
52,79
.   Automatic processing is reasonably effortless or passive, with controlled 
processing more likely to predominate when conflicting or disconfirming evidence is present and active 
deliberation is necessary to resolve contradicting information and demands
77
.   Both unconscious 
processing and consciously guided conceptual-level processes would come into play, allowing observer 
knowledge to refine judgements about the nature of the other’s distress. Thus, elements of automatic 
processing are implicated in controlled reactions.  There would be consideration of risks and appraisal of 
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strategies for harm avoidance for oneself and the person in pain
92, 41
.  Beliefs (true and false), 
expectations, or prior knowledge would have an impact, as would the capacity for self-regulation of 
emotions, and empathy.  Reasoned appraisal should lead to a broad understanding of the other’s 
experience, its origins and likely outcomes.  While one can distinguish between bottom up and top down 
processes, they operate in parallel, with conscious processing persisting longer than the immediate 
spontaneous reaction
38
.   
Interactions between controlled and automatic processing in sufferers and observers 
Observer reactions appear to vary systematically with the different categories of pain expression 
in the person being observed (see Figure 1 for a schematic representation of the interaction).  Expression 
of pain indicative of automatic reactions to situations (reflexes, emotional reactions) instigates different 
reactions in observers than controlled reactions indicative of planned, goal-directed behavior.  Thus, 
different manifestations of pain would not be equivalent to others in their capacity to instigate particular 
reaction patterns.   
Observer reactions to automatic expression.  These stimulus driven reactions would be intuitive 
and immediate.  The observer need only be passive, but the impact appears potent.  Facial displays 
depicting vivid emotional expression have been found to be particularly effective in commanding 
attention and to be prepotent in their impact
37
.  Little cognitive participation in the emotional reaction 
would be expected, although efforts to understand what is happening would also be immediately 
instigated (controlled reactions).  In the primordial world, through to the present, observing these 
reactions in others would instigate a sense of personal danger with fear for the other person a 
subordinate response
45,73,92
.  
It is noteworthy that the cues most likely to instigate emotional processing fall in the domains of 
raw visual or auditory experience.  These sensory modalities are also basic to reading and speech but 
these human capabilities rely extensively upon more complex, learned cognitive skills. Linguistic and 
literacy skills come to be acquired slowly during development of the child, signalling the complexity of 
Kenneth D. Craig 
 13 
the cognitive processes engaged when language or written communications are used to convey 
information about painful states. The semantic features of self reports rely upon symbolic/linguistic 
mediation, or top down processing.  However, paralinguistic qualities of speech convey the emotional or 
mood status of the speaker and some forms of language (e.g., swear words, particularly evocative 
language used by authors or patients, or poetry) are capable of instigating immediate, vigorous visceral 
reactions
66
.  Language also has a capacity to automatically instigate certain automatic appraisals of 
events from memory when objects of attitudes are encountered, for example, prejudices
32, 33
. 
Observer reactions to intentional expression.  While also immediate, these observer reactions 
would be of longer duration, as decoding and appraisal of information would require complex and 
effortful
62
 cognitive processing.  This would require attentional and problem solving resources, as effort 
was expended to sort out competing interpretations.  The subtle nuances of language are important in 
differential diagnosis as alternative explanations of signs and symptoms are explored.  In everyday 
social experience, when pain complaints are made, there must be similar searches among competing 
explanations of the origins of the individual’s complaints.  Listeners are likely to appreciate that the 
account is determined by both internal states being described and the speaker’s appraisal of the situation.   
The suffering person’s capacity to control expression would make the expression more difficult 
to understand, more ambiguous as to its origins, and less readily interpreted as the immediate product of 
specific stimuli.  It seems less likely that controlled reactions alone would be capable of triggering the 
same full empathic emotional reactions provoked by automatic bottom up stimuli, although, as discussed 
above, skilled narrators or writers seem capable of generating verbal scenarios capable of provoking 
resonant reactions in others.  Patients often work hard to present convincing cases of the gravity of their 
condition
89
.  Given awareness of the potential for voluntary control, risks of fabrication may be 
appraised.   
People presenting with pain invariably are subject to careful appraisal by others
18, 82
.  While trust 
seems the accepted norm and clinicians are routinely enjoined to believe patient self-report of pain, 
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optimal care giving and prudent stewardship of resources require judgements about the legitimacy of the 
representations of the person in distress.  Medically unexplained pain appears particularly susceptible to 
doubts about the credibility of complaints.  Patients for whom there is no scientific explanation of their 
pain are described as at risk of being marginalized from meaningful professional care and treatment
14
.  
In the absence of medical evidence for tissue damage or stress, examiners must rely upon symptom 
complaints; hence, credibility is likely to be questioned.  Universal propensities to detect cheaters have 
been postulated by evolutionary biologists to account for careful scrutiny of others in social 
transactions
13,20,48,49 ,90
.   Prkachin, Solomon and Ross
70
 observed that suspicions surrounding the 
motivations of the patient impacted pain judgments during clinical decision making.  Enjoining health 
care practitioners to utilize and believe self-report to some extent appears to be founded upon implicit 
recognition of the limited effectiveness of self-report in generating resonant feelings in observers.   
Conclusions 
Understanding the process whereby observers infer the presence and nature of pain in others 
requires an appreciation of the interaction between the expressive behaviour of people manifesting pain 
and the multiple affective and cognitive systems regulating the reactions of observers.  The distinction 
between automatic and controlled information processing systems appears valuable in interpreting both 
the reactions of people in pain and of observers whose attention is directed to understanding the 
experience of the person in pain.  The appraisal of the observer appears driven by both self interest and 
altruistic concern.  The experience of pain in others can alert observers to risk of personal danger, as 
well as the potential that the other person requires care.  Spontaneous (automatic) expressions of pain 
are more likely to instigate strong empathic reactions in observers, whereas controlled expressions that 
lack spontaneity are more likely to lead to questions about credibility.  Understanding the complexities 
of the interaction between persons in pain and those reacting to them is likely to enhance delivery of 
care.   
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Figure 1: 
 
 
  EXPRESSION OF PERSON IN PAIN 
OBSERVER 
REACTION  
 
 
Automatic ( reflexive 
escape, facial 
grimaces, cry) 
Controlled  
(deliberate self-
report, purposive 
actions) 
Automatic 
(involuntary, gut 
level) 
LIKELY:  involuntary 
emotional responses 
LESS LIKELY (but 
possible) 
Controlled 
(contemplation,  
active decision-
making) 
PARALLEL: including 
delayed reflection 
LIKELY  
(reflection, question 
credibility) 
 
 
Figure 1.  A representation of the probable reactions of observers to automatic and expressive displays 
of people in pain.  Automatic expression is likely to instigate automatic, emotional reactions, as well as 
parallel cognitive appraisal.  Controlled expression is less likely to evoke powerful automatic/emotional 
reactions in observers, but will instigate reflection and interest in various sources of the expression.   
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Figure Legend 
Figure 1.  A representation of the probable reactions of observers to automatic and expressive displays 
of people in pain.  Automatic expression is likely to instigate automatic, emotional reactions, as well as 
parallel cognitive appraisal.  Controlled expression is less likely to evoke powerful automatic/emotional 
reactions in observers, but will instigate reflection and interest in various sources of the expression.   
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Abstract 
 
Recent developments in clinical, cognitive and behavioural sciences as well as in social 
neuroscience can provide new perspectives on our understanding of different forms of pain expression 
and the social reactions of observers to various types of pain expression.  Studies indicate that pain 
expression is governed by both automatic (unintentional, reflexive) and controlled (intentional, 
purposive) neuroregulatory systems.  Reciprocal mechanisms in observers responsible for automatic 
(unintentional, reflexive) and controlled (intentional, reflective) reactions also appear important.  
Observers appear more likely to display immediate “visceral”, emotional reactions to unintentional, 
reflexive expression, whereas controlled expression characterized by purposive, articulated behaviour 
appears more likely to elicit contemplative reflection on the nature and origins of the person’s pain.  
This review summarizes pertinent research within the context of a theoretical model for understanding 
how pain is perceived in others.   
Perspective:  People attempting to understand another person’s pain may have access to the 
person’s spontaneous behavioural reaction as well as verbal report and other purposive communications.  
The former instigates reflexive and emotional reactions whereas the latter tends to be perceived as 
confounding expression of experience with response to situational demands.   
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Perceiving Pain in Others: Automatic and Controlled Mechanisms 
Recognizing and interpreting the significance of pain expression in others can be of great 
importance to the suffering person and the person witnessing the other’s distress.  Various actions, 
including language, paralinguistic vocalizations, facial expression, body posture, and escape or 
avoidance behaviour, may signal pain to others. These events can command the attention of observers 
from perspectives of both self-interest and social beneficence (and sometimes malevolence). They 
permit recognition of potential danger and provide opportunity for harm avoidance at the same time as 
they allow appreciation of what is happening to the person in pain, perhaps leading to provision of 
care
37
care
45, 3341, 8092
.  The adaptive value of responding to pain in others is embedded in the evolutionary 
history of humans and ancestral species
6
species
7, 2227, 2430,87, 7890
.   Despite its importance, the study of the 
social transaction initiated by pain expression is not well developed
70
developed
80,82, 79
,
91
 although it is 
fundamental for understanding pain assessment in research and clinical practice
72
practice
83
. 
Recent developments in clinical, cognitive and behavioural sciences as well as in social 
neuroscience can provide new perspectives on our understanding of different forms of pain expression 
and the social reactions of observers.  Studies indicate that pain expression is governed by both 
automatic (unintentional, reflexive) and controlled (intentional, purposive) neuroregulatory 
systems
35
systems
43
.  Reciprocal mechanisms in observers responsible for automatic (unintentional, 
reflexive) and controlled (intentional, reflective) reactions also appear important.  This review 
summarizes research within a theoretical model of how pain is perceived in others.   
The Background 
Tapping into the pain experience of another through use of painful expression is a challenging 
task.  Expression can only partially represent the complexity of the subjective experience; hence, they 
are not equivalent
 or isomorphic1626, 3543, 4755, 4856, 7586
.  At the neurobiological level of analysis, different 
systems are associated with pain experience and expression.  Studies of sensory and affective features of 
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pain experience have focused upon afferent nociceptive and neuropathic mechanisms and central 
processing
11
processing
15
, whereas investigations of pain expression necessitate examination of systems 
responsible for language and efferent neuromotor regulatory mechanisms
76
mechanisms
80,88, 70
.    
Operationalizing the distinction between pain experience and expression poses problems.  From 
the research perspective, experience cannot be studied through other than some form of expression.  
Inevitably, understanding the pain experience of another requires inference.  One can identify various 
cues to be important in for observer judgments in the behaviour of the person in pain (self-report, other 
features of vocalizations, facial activity, body activity, limb withdrawal, writhing, and other nonverbal 
behaviors).  Other evidence such ascan be important.  For example, the presence of precipitants of 
injury
4250,61
, actual bodily injury, and physiological response to tissue stress or pathology
5
 can also 
influence judgements.  However, the presence and experience of pain are often poorly related to the 
nature and magnitude of tissue stress or damage
11
.  The inferences and judgments of observers 
necessitate attention to the behavioural reactions of the person in pain.   
The primary resources available for examining the subjective experience of pain are self-report 
and nonverbal expression, categories of pain response that are readily differentiated and usually 
identified as conceptually different.  In tightly controlled studies, they can be highly 
correlated
47
correlated
55
; more typically they are only modestly correlated, with contextual factors 
determining the magnitude of the relationship
48
relationship
56, 6170
.   
In competent, well-motivated people, self-report can provide a valid estimate of pain.  But the 
need for competence in cognitive functioning and the potential for biased responses reflecting sufferer 
expectations and needs cannot be ignored
43
ignored
51, 6978
.  The individual’s perception of optimal 
performance and outcome in a given setting appears crucial and determines self-presentation.  Those 
assessing the person for pain also may bias self-report by providing cues as to what level of report is 
expected or appropriate.  Thus, self-report must be recognized as representing some combination of 
expression of personal experience and a response to an appraisal of the immediate situation.   
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Nonverbal expression typically is endorsed as important when infants, young children, seniors 
with dementia, or others with communication limitations are unable to provide self-report
13
report
17, 3846
.  
However, nonverbal assessment is also important in everyday and clinical social discourse.  Nonverbal 
expression typically adds context and meaning to language and can be perceived as more credible than 
self-report because it is not as subject to conscious control as the use of language
67
.  But similar to self-
report, nonverbal expression is not exclusively reflexive. It also confounds subjective experience and 
situational demands.  Nonverbal expression is sensitive to audiences
46
audiences
54, 71,  6069, 81,7485
.  People 
also can be reasonably successful in suppressing or exaggerating nonverbal pain 
expression
21
expression
26, 4048, 3644, 5058
, in accordance with perception of situational demands, thereby 
again confounding spontaneous with socially predicated expression.  It is not surprising that observers, 
clinicians or otherwise, experience difficulties in determining whether either self-report or nonverbal 
behaviour represent manifestations of pain experience or reactions to self-serving or situational demand 
biases.   
We propose an alternative classification that distinguishes between automatic, reflexive features 
of the response to pain, perhaps best illustrated by the protective nociceptive flexion reflex
29
reflex
36, 89
, 
and expressions of pain that reflect higher levels of central processing or purposive, deliberative control.  
Automatic reactions, whether in response to pain or other life events, tend to be sufficiently transparent 
so as to signify their direct meaning, and include “screaming in pain, laughing with joy, and growling 
with anger”5260, (p. 29). Controlled, intentional expression is typified by the use of language for self-
report purposes but also would include integrated sequences of instrumental motor activity
35
activity
43, 
4856
.  The distinction is important because observers are disposed to attributing causes to other persons’ 
actions
39
actions
47,  5159
.  Reflexive activity is considered to have quite different functional implications 
than activities that are suggestive of deliberate intention and executive control.  Complexity is added by 
the reality that although pain behaviour may be unintentional (e.g., facial expression, or even 
Formatted: Font: Italic
Comment [KD5]: Ekman, P, Rosenberg E (eds.):  
What facial expression reveals about emotions, 
development, psychopathology and health. (Second 
edition).  Oxford, UK,:  Oxford University Press, 
2005 
 
Formatted: Font: 12 pt
Kenneth D. Craig 
 8 
nociceptive pain reflexes), it is can be controllable to a certain extent (e.g., inhibiting facial expression, 
exaggerating withdrawal reactions, etc.)
4452, 5968, 71
. 
The distinction between systems that are automatic, on the one hand, or subject to processing and 
control, on the other, also characterizes observer reactions.  Witnessing others reacting to acute painful 
events is capable of instigating immediate “visceral” or gut level emotional experiences12experiences16.  
The rapidly unfolding social neuroscience literature on cerebral correlates of witnessing others in painful 
distress documents the brain states to be observed
42
observed
50, 5463, 6473
.  These automatic, uncontrollable 
reactions are accompanied by immediate attention and parallel controlled reflective appraisal of the 
nature of the other person’s situation, as well as attention to likely sources of the activity observed, as 
the observer seeks to understand what is happening to the other person.   
The theoretical distinction between two major observable behavioural sources of information 
concerning another person’s pain experience and two major patterns of reacting to others in pain arises 
from theoretical and empirically derived models of information processing implicating at the extremes 
automatic and controlled mechanisms, with these interrelated and operative in varying 
degrees
53
degrees
62,  2734
.  The proposition that human performance results from an interplay between 
automatic and controlled processing of information
63
 information
72
 is predicated upon the understanding 
that in complex environments attention must be guided to process critical stimuli, yet other routine, well 
rehearsed and overlearned activities are executed repetitively without demands on attention.  yet other 
vegetative and well rehearsed actions occur without direction.  It has been applied to understanding 
social interaction phenomena in other contexts
68
contexts
77, 3
 
3
 including study of such phenomena as 
automatic stereotype activation
2
activation
2, 10
.
12
   
The following elaborates on this distinction as it contributes to understanding how those 
experiencing pain react and how observers respond to different forms of pain display.   
Automatic and Controlled Features of the Behaviour of the Person in Pain 
Kenneth D. Craig 
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Systematic differences in the categories of painful expression set the occasion for variation in 
how observers perceive and respond to the person in pain.   
Unintentional expressions of painful experience.  Automatic pain manifestations are involuntary, 
spontaneous, triggered, stereotyped, predisposed sets of behavioural reactions elicited by noxious 
stimuli.  They accompany but do not wholly or exclusively represent the sensory, affective and cognitive 
features of pain.  From a physiological perspective, they are the somatomotor features of the coordinated 
central, hormonal, and autonomic response to tissue insult that have the relatively distinctive character 
of preparing the person to defend against tissue damage, in all its complexity.   
In considering types of automatic behaviour it is useful to distinguish between observable actions 
that are directly protective, because they permit escape or avoidance of sources of pain, and those that 
are indirectly protective because they communicate distress to others, thereby eliciting their protective 
interventions
7080
.  The former are represented by withdrawal reflexes and assuming guarded 
postures
45
postures
53
. They act largely outside conscious awareness and deliberation.  Communicative 
actions can also be reflexive or automatic.  Infant behavioural reactions to painful events are reasonably 
seen as evolved protective behaviour, with control only emerging later on in infancy
18
infancy
23, 3442, 5260
.  
During the earliest moments and months of life, some of the protective behaviour is primarily in the 
form of social communication, for example, crying or facial expression, thereby informing parents and 
other adults potentially able to intervene with sources of distress and/or danger
34
danger
42
.  
Many communicative and other protective actions are reasonably construed as biologically 
prepared and unlearned.  In older children and adults, continuity and stereotypy in various 
manifestations of pain can be observed
18
observed
23
.  Features of facial expression, paralinguistic 
qualities of speech, guarded behaviour and protective posture would appear to satisfy criteria for 
unintentional signs of pain, i.e., they are reflexive, display striking structural and functional consistency 
across the life span, the person largely is not cognizant aware of them, but they can be controlled to a 
certain extent.  Criteria for automatic actions, as defined by Moors & De Houwer
62
 include processing at 
Kenneth D. Craig 
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a relatively non-conscious level, efficiency in terms of not requiring effortful processing, absence of a 
formulated goal, and being purely stimulus driven (see criteria for the automatic/controlled distinction in 
Moors & De Houwer
53
).   Concerning observable actions relevant to social communication, facial 
expression is typically the most salient and instructive for the observer
19
observer
24, 6170, 7890
. A relatively 
stereotyped facial display of pain has been identified that is distinguishable from othernon-noxious 
emotional and other states, both behaviourally, in the judgments of others
65
 others
74
 and in observer 
brain states observed documented through neuro-imaging
64
imaging
73
, but other socially relevant actions 
may be identifiable, for example, cry and paralinguistic qualities of speech.   
Automatic responses are expected to be relatively stimulus driven and independent of attention 
and contextual influence
53
influence
62
.  However, it is clear that emotional and cognitive factors may 
modify reflexive responses, for example, stress induced analgesia is capable of diminishing reflexive 
withdrawal responses in rats and humans
28
 humans
35
 and negative emotions can potentiate startle in 
humans
5
humans
6
.  While facial expression is a candidate for relatively immediate responding without 
conscious attending to the display, it is context-sensitive and linked to environmental demands.  For 
example, presence of an audience of strangers tends to inhibit facial expression of pain
46
pain
54
, although 
children who engage in high levels of catastrophizing appear to indiscriminately display pain and are 
less likely to suppress pain expression
75
expression
86
.  Furthermore, automatic responses are to some 
extent subject to voluntary control, for example, suppression
62
 suppression
71
 or 
enhancement
40
enhancement
48
.   As children mature, originally automatic manifestations of pain come at 
least partially under voluntary control.  For example, the essentially reflexive crying of the neonate 
becomes more of a speech act
20
 act
25
 and children learn to suppress pain expression in the presence of 
peers when negative reactions are anticipated
50
anticipated
58
. Control can be achieved over facial 
displays of pain
17
pain
22
, including both exaggeration and suppression of the display; however, the 
exaggerated display differs from the genuine display in subtle ways
41
ways
49
, and neither faking nor 
suppression of facial displays are wholly successful
36
successful
44, 5867
.   
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Intentional expressions of painful experience.  These can be construed as typically deliberate, 
conscious, and coordinated by executive functions
1
.  The latter are implicated when complex cognitive 
sub-processes such as planning, anticipation, and decision-making become engaged.  The use of 
language appears to best illustrate controlled expression of pain.   It is noteworthy that complex, 
coordinated or innovative responses to situational demands can come to be relatively automatic, in this 
instance enacted without deliberation, when thoroughly well rehearsed in particular situations
3, 5362
.   
Understanding controlled expression would appear to be more important to understanding human 
pain expression, although continuity in controlled expression across primate species is 
evident
22
evident
27
.  Interaction between automatic reactions and controlled expressions would be 
expected, with the latter coming to modulate the former in the course of human ontogeny, but there are 
limits to the extent that automatic expressions can be over-ridden by conscious control.   
Automatic and Controlled Features of Perceiving Pain in Others 
Cues related to pain in another person have the potential to influence observer perception of pain, 
some as a result of automatic activation, with others acquiring meaning only through conscious 
deliberation and executive processing.   The act of perceiving others in pain has been characterized in a 
theoretical model of pain empathy as the product of both bottom-up and top-down variables
30
variables
38, 
3139.  “Bottom-up” information is derived through perception of the actions of the person manifesting 
pain.  The concept refers primarily to automatic reactions to the painful reactions of others and would 
implicate the detection of pain.  This is appraised and achieves significance for the observer through 
utilization of “top-down” information reflecting application of the beliefs, expectancies, attitudes and 
biases of the observer, a process characterized by greater levels of controlled processing..  
Automatic Reactions.   These are characterized as reflexive, intuitive, automatic “gut feelings” 
evoked by the pain reactions of others. These “visceral” reactions are reasonably construed as more 
ancient in their evolutionary origins, conserved across phyla by virtue of their functional advantages in 
warning, motivating and protecting progenitors, thereby increasing reproductive fitness.  There would 
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appear to be automatic processing of cues through biologically prepared innate, unconditioned feature 
detectors that give rise to reflex-like responses.  Current brain imaging studies of biological reactivity 
demonstrate a powerful and immediate biological impact of the experience of observing witnessing 
others in pain on observers
7
observers
8, 2328, 4250, 5463, 6473, 6776
.    
Reactions are influenced by contextual factors (e.g., setting and social cues, and characteristics 
of the person in pain
15
pain
19,29, 3240, 49
)
57
.  The relationship between the observer and the person in pain 
can dictates the reaction and perhaps commitment to the person in pain.  This is evident in both 
behavioural and brain imaging studies (e.g., professional, family, stranger).  For example, judgements of 
pain in infants differ systematically across parents, nurses and pediatricians
56
 pediatricians
65
 and the 
perceived fairness of others expressing pain were found to modulate empathic neural 
responses
66
responses
75
.    
Automatic reaction patterns would not be restricted to reflexive or autonomic activation, but 
could include automatic instigation of thoughts, beliefs and biases.  Inherent sensitivity would appear to 
involve matching of stimulus input to prepared schema, thereby instigating unconditioned and 
coordinated reaction patterns. In turn these reactions would be amenable to conditioning and yield 
templates that guide automatic evaluation of perceived threat and reactions thereafter
4, 910, 5564, 7384
. 
Controlled processing.  When an observer attends to another person’s plight, automatic reactions 
would be accompanied by efforts to understand and plan actions suitable to the situation
77
. There is a 
need to know not only what is happening to the individual but also why this is happening, what 
sequence of events led to the person’s painful distress, and what the person could do, or what the 
observer could do to resolve the situation.  Problem-solving, memory, judgment, attitudes and biases are 
likely to be implicated.  When an observer attends to another person’s distress or situational demands 
dictate attention to the person’s plight, a range of cognitive and affective processes are implicated in 
decision-making, including memory, problem-solving, judgment, various heuristics, attitudes and biases.  
This higher level of neuroregulatory information processing would implicate executive functions
52,79
.   
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Automatic processing is reasonably effortless or passive, with controlled processing more likely to 
predominate when conflicting or disconfirming evidence is present and active processing deliberation is 
necessary to resolve the contradictiong information and demands
77
.   Both unconscious processing and 
consciously guided conceptual-level processes would come into play, deploying propositional 
knowledge toallowing observer knowledge to refine judgements of about the nature of the other’s 
distress. Thus, elements of automatic processing are implicated in controlled reactions.  There would be 
consideration of risks and appraisal of strategies for harm avoidance for both oneselfoneself and the 
person in pain
80
pain
92, 3341
.  Beliefs (true and false), expectations, or prior knowledge would have an 
impact, as would the capacity for higher level decision making, the capacity for self-regulation of 
emotions, and empathy.  Reasoned appraisal should lead to a broad understanding of the other’s 
experience, its origins and likely outcomes.  While one can distinguish between bottom up and top down 
processes, they operate in parallel, with conscious processing persisting longer than the immediate 
spontaneous reaction
38
.   
Interactions between controlled and automatic processing in sufferers and observers 
Observer reactions appear to vary systematically with the different categories of pain expression. 
in the person being observed (see Figure 1 for a schematic representation of the interaction).  Expression 
of pain indicative of automatic reactions to situations (reflexes, emotional reactions) instigates different 
reactions in observers than controlled reactions indicative of personal agencyplanned, goal-directed 
behavior.  Thus, different manifestations of pain would not be equivalent to others in their capacity to 
instigate particular reaction patterns (see Figure 1).   
Observer reactions to automatic expression.  These stimulus driven reactions would be intuitive 
and immediate.  The observer need only be passive, but the impact appears potent.  Facial displays 
depicting vivid emotional expression have been found to be particularly effective in commanding 
attention and to be prepotent in their impact
37
.  This is the default mode.  Little cognitive participation in 
the emotional reaction would be expected, although efforts to understand what is happening would also 
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be immediately instigated (controlled reactions).  In the primordial world, through to the present, 
observing these reactions in others would instigate a sense of personal danger with fear for the other 
person a subordinate response
37
response
45,73, 8092
.  
It is noteworthy that the cues most likely to instigate emotional processing fall in the domains of 
raw visual or auditory experience.  These sensory modalities are also basic to reading and speech but 
these human capabilities rely extensively upon more complex, learned cognitive skills. Linguistic and 
literacy skills come to be acquired slowly during development of the child, signalling the complexity of 
the cognitive processes engaged when language or written communications are used to convey 
information about painful states. The semantic features of self reports rely upon symbolic/linguistic 
mediation, or top down processing.  However, paralinguistic or prosodic qualities of speech convey the 
emotional or mood status of the speaker and some forms of language (e.g., cuss swear words, 
particularly evocative language used by authors or patients, or poetry) are capable of instigating 
immediate, vigorous visceral reactions
57
reactions
66
.  Language also has a capacity to automatically 
instigate certain automatic appraisals of events from memory when objects of attitudes objects are 
encountered, for example, prejudices
25
prejudices
32, 2633
. 
Observer rReactions to intentional expression.  While also immediate, these observer reactions 
would be of longer duration, as decoding and appraisal the of information and the appraisal would 
require complex and effortful
62
 cognitive processing.  This would require attentional and problem 
solving resources, as effort was expended to sort out competing interpretations.  The subtle nuances of 
language are important in differential diagnosis as alternative explanations of signs and symptoms are 
explored.  In everyday social experience, when pain complaints are made, there must be similar searches 
among competing explanations of the origins of the individual’s complaints.  Listeners are likely to 
appreciate that the account is determined by both internal states being described and the speaker’s 
appraisal of the situation.   
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The suffering person’s capacity to control expression would make the expression more difficult 
to understand, more ambiguous as to its origins, and less readily interpreted as the immediate product of 
specific stimuli.  It seems less likely that controlled reactions alone would be capable of triggering, or 
instantiating, the same full empathic emotional reactions provoked by automatic bottom up stimuli, 
although, as discussed above, skilled narrators or writers seem capable of generating verbal scenarios 
capable of provoking resonant reactions in others.  Patients often work hard to present convincing cases 
of the gravity of their condition
make the objective/rational assessments less an intellectual experience and more an emotional drama7789
.  
Given awareness of the potential for voluntary control, risks of fabrication may be appraised.   
People presenting with pain invariably are subject to careful appraisal by others
14
others
18, 82
.  
While trust seems the accepted norm and clinicians are routinely enjoined to believe patient self-report 
of pain, optimal care giving and prudent stewardship of resources require judgements about the 
legitimacy of the representations of the person in distress.  Medically unexplained pain appears 
particularly susceptible to doubts about the credibility of complaints.  Patients for whom there is no 
scientific explanation of their pain are described as at risk of being marginalized from meaningful 
professional care and treatment
14
.  In the absence of medical evidence for tissue damage or stress, 
examiners must rely upon symptom complaints; hence, credibility is likely to be questioned.  Universal 
propensities to detect cheaters have been postulated by evolutionary biologists to account for careful 
scrutiny of others in social transactions
13,20,48,49 ,90
.   Prkachin, Solomon and Ross
61
 Ross
70
 observed that 
suspicions surrounding the motivations of the patient impacted pain judgments during clinical decision 
making.  Enjoining health care practitioners to utilize and believe self-report to some extent appears to 
be founded upon implicit recognition of the limited effectiveness of self-report in generating resonant 
feelings in observers.   
Conclusions 
Understanding the process whereby observers infer the presence and nature of pain in others 
requires an appreciation of the interaction between the expressive behaviour of people manifesting pain 
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and the multiple affective and cognitive systems regulating the reactions of observers.  The distinction 
between automatic and controlled information processing systems appears valuable in interpreting both 
the reactions of people in pain and of observers whose attention is directed to understanding the 
experience of the person in pain.  The appraisal of the observer appears driven by both self interest and 
altruistic concern.  The experience of pain in others can alert observers to risk of personal danger, as 
well as the potential that the other person requires care.  Spontaneous (automatic) expressions of pain 
are more likely to instigate strong empathic reactions in observers, whereas controlled expressions that 
lack spontaneity are more likely to lack lead to questions about credibility.  Understanding the 
complexities of the interaction between persons in pain and those reacting to them is likely to enhance 
delivery of care.   
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Figure 1: 
 
 
  EXPRESSION OF PERSON IN PAIN 
OBSERVER 
REACTION  
 
 
Automatic ( reflexive 
escape, facial 
grimaces, cry) 
Controlled  
(deliberate self-
report, purposive 
actions) 
Automatic 
(involuntary, gut 
level) 
LIKELY:  involuntary 
emotional responses 
LESS LIKELY (but 
possible) 
Controlled 
(contemplation,  
active decision-
making) 
PARALLEL: including 
delayed reflection 
LIKELY  
(reflection, question 
credibility) 
 
 
Figure 1.  A representation of the probable reactions of observers to automatic and expressive displays 
of people in pain.  Automatic expression is likely to instigate automatic, emotional reactions, as well as 
parallel cognitive appraisal.  Controlled expression is less likely to evoke powerful automatic/emotional 
reactions in observers, but will instigate reflection and interest in various sources of the expression.   
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Figure 1.  A representation of the probable reactions of observers to automatic and expressive displays 
of people in pain.  Automatic expression is likely to instigate automatic, emotional reactions, as well as 
parallel cognitive appraisal.  Controlled expression is less likely to evoke powerful automatic/emotional 
reactions in observers, but will instigate reflection and interest in various sources of the expression.   
 
 
Dear Dr. Gebhart: 
 
 Thank you for the opportunity to submit a revision of our 
manuscript "Perceiving pain in others: Automatic and controlled 
mechanisms".  We very much appreciated the recommendations and 
observations of the reviewers and have revised the paper in accordance 
with all the suggestions, excepting two observations.  We have detailed 
the various changes in the following, including explanations for 
deciding to not follow through on two suggestions (see comments on 
Reviewer #2 observations below). 
 
 Your editorial decision letter: 
  
“References 31, 32, 33 and 80 are listed as "in press." If possible, 
these should be updated with publication information.” 
 
 These papers have all been published and complete publication 
information is now provided. 
 
Reviewer #1: 
 
1) “Accessibility to average reader--The manuscript contains a fair 
amount of psychological terminology which may not be familiar to 
the average reader of the journal.  This is unfortunate since it 
reduces its potential impact on the field.  The authors should 
consider attempting to reframe some of the terminology to deal 
with this problem.” 
 
We have carefully reviewed the paper for jargon not that accessible 
to others and attempted to make the text clearer.  Words or 
expressions such as the following were removed or explained in 
clearer language: isomorphic, cognizant, heuristic, prosodic, 
deploying propositional knowledge, personal agency, instantiating.   
 
2) “Citations--Many of the assertions made do not carry citations 
with them.  It would be good to increase the number of citations 
for readers who wish to examine the evidence underpinning these 
assertions.” 
 
Again we reviewed the paper in an effort to establish where we had 
failed to provide adequate citations.  The following 12 papers have 
now been referenced in addition to the 80 in the original paper.  We 
could add more, but believe the additional references would be 
redundant to those provided.  
 
Vogel, G. (2004). The evolution of the golden rule. Science, 303, 1128-1131. 
 
Tait RC, Chibnall JT, Kalauokalani D: Provider judgments of patients in pain: 
Seeking symptom certainty. Pain Medicine 10: 11-34, 2009 
 
Marquie L, Raufaste E, Lauque D, Marine C, Ecoiffier M, Sorum P: Pain ratings by 
patients and physicians: Evidence of systematic pain miscalibration. Pain 102: 
289-296, 2003 
 
* Revision Notes
Bennett-Branson, S.M., & Craig, K.D.  (1993).  Postoperative pain in children: 
Developmental and family influences on spontaneous coping strategies.  
Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 25, 355-383. 
 
Chou R, Fu R, Carrion JA, Deyo RA: Imaging strategies for low-back pain: 
Systematic review and meta-analysis.  Lancet 373: 463-472, 2009. 
 
Ekman, P, Rosenberg E (eds.):  What facial expression reveals about emotions, development, 
psychopathology and health. (Second edition).  Oxford, UK,:  Oxford University Press, 
2005 
 
Decety J, Michalska KJ, Akitsuki Y: Who caused the pain? An fMRI investigation of 
empathy and intentionality in children. Neuropsychologia 46: 2607-2614, 2008 
 
Stuss DT, Alexander MP: Executive functions and the frontal lobes: a conceptual 
review.  Psychol. Res. 63: 289-298. 2000 
 
Fridlund, A.J. (1994).  Human facial expression: An evolutionary view.  San Diego, 
CA: Academic. 
 
Cowley AW, Cowley T, Norton NJ, Norton WF: Foreword, in Mayer EA, Bushnell 
MC (eds.): Functional pain syndromes: Presentation and pathophysiology. 
Seattle, WA, IASP Press, 2009, pp. xiii  
 
Craig, K.D. & Badali, M.A. (2004). Introduction to the Special Series on the 
Detection of Pain Deception and Malingering.  Clinical Journal of Pain, 20, 377-
382. 
 
Cosmides L, Tooby J: Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. in Barkow JH, 
Cosmides L, Tooby J (eds.): The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary psychology and the 
generation of culture. New York NY, Oxford University Press, 1992, 163-228 
 
3) “Page 10--Consider giving more detailed examples of the range of 
cognitive and affective processes involved in decision making.  
This would help readers much better understand the potential 
influence of memory, problem solving, judgement, heuristics, and 
biases.” 
 
This component of the paper addresses the nature of the “Controlled 
Processes” instigated by viewing others in pain.  We have contrasted 
automatic and controlled processes in several places in the paper.  
In this section we revised the statement to the following in the 
interests of clarifying observer processing that is more effortful 
in the interests of making sense of the suffering person’s painful 
distress: 
 
“When an observer attends to another person’s plight, automatic 
reactions would be accompanied by efforts to understand and plan 
actions suitable to the situation77. There is a need to know not only 
what is happening to the individual but also why this is happening, 
what sequence of events led to the person’s painful distress, and 
what the person could do, or what the observer could do to resolve 
the situation.  Problem-solving, memory, judgment, attitudes and 
biases are likely to be implicated.” 
 
4) “Page 11--Explain what is meant by the term “personal agency” in 
the sentence that ends: "controlled reactions indicative of 
personal agency".  Readers may not understand this.  Also, 
describe what is meant by "default mode" in the next paragraph.” 
 
The term personal agency clearly is psychology jargon.  We replaced  
it by “planned goal-directed behavior”.  The sentence “This is the 
default mode.” is redundant, hence deleted.   
 
5) Page 12--Emotional drama--I think many investigators in this area 
would object to the sentence "Patients often work hard to make 
the objective/rational assessments less an intellectual 
experinece and more an emotional drama."  When one thinks of the 
large number of people who experience and report on their pain, 
this statement seems like an over-simplification.  It does not 
seem to adequately capture the research literature in this area. 
I would recommend dropping this sentence or qualifying it more. 
 
We agree with the reviewer and have replaced the sentence with 
“Patients often work hard to present convincing cases of the gravity 
of their condition89.” 
 
Reviewer #2: 
 
1 “It would be helpful to have some brief elaboration of how Moors 
& de Houwer distinguish automatic and controlled processing, 
rather than only the reference, to help readers.” 
 
Good observation and readily, briefly accomplished.  We added Moors 
and de Houwer’s criteria for automatic processing as per the 
following sentence:  
 
“Criteria for automatic actions, as defined by Moors & De Houwer62 
include processing at a relatively non-conscious level, efficiency 
in terms of not requiring effortful processing, absence of a 
formulated goal, and being purely stimulus driven.” 
 
2 I'd have liked to see comments on hypotheses around in the field 
at present, particularly those informing empirical work, such as 
that simulated pain expression is as good as controlled pain 
expression for studying observers' reactions (Rainville and 
others); that pain behaviour, including facial expression can be 
divided into protective and communicative behaviours (Sullivan 
and colleagues), or is this distinction not in the behaviours but 
in their interpretation by observers; or that there might be 
priority processing for apparently inauthentic expression by a 
cheater detection algorithm (Williams and colleagues).  
 
Concerning the first point, we have published a number of studies 
examining the proposition that “simulated pain expression is as good 
as controlled pain expression for studying observers' reactions 
(Rainville and others)”.  In brief summary, people do well in 
simulating pain expression (Poole, G.D., & Craig, K.D.  (1992).  Judgments of 
genuine, suppressed and faked facial expressions of pain.  Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology: Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes, 63, 797-805.), 
but there are subtle differences (Craig, K. D., Hyde, S. A., & Patrick, C. J.  
(1991).  Genuine, suppressed, and faked facial behavior during exacerbation of 
chronic low back pain.  Pain, 46, 161-172.  Hill, M.L., & Craig, K.D. (2002).  
Detecting deception in pain expressions: The structure of genuine and deceptive 
facial displays. Pain, 98, 135-144.) that are discernible to observers  
(Hadjistavropoulos, H.D., Craig, K.D., Hadjistavropoulos, T., & Poole, G.D.  (1996).  
Subjective judgments of deception in pain expression:  Accuracy and errors.  Pain, 
65, 247-254.).  Observers can be taught to distinguish simulated 
displays with difficulty and not all that successfully (Hill, M.L., & 
Craig, K.D. (2004).  Detecting deception in facial expressions of pain: Accuracy and 
training.  Clinical Journal of Pain, 20, 415-422.).  Skill in dissimulating 
pain appears acquired, as children do not do as well as adults 
(Larochette, A.C, Chambers, C.T., & Craig, K.D. (2006).  Genuine, suppressed and 
faked facial expressions of pain in children. Pain, 126, 64-71.).  We have 
addressed the complexities of detecting simulation in several review 
chapters, e.g., Craig, K.D., Hill, M.L., McMurtry, B. (1999).  Detecting 
deception and alingering.  In A.R. Block, E.F. Kramer, & E. Fernandez (Eds.), 
Handbook of Chronic Pain Syndromes:  Biopsychosocial Perspectives. pp. 41-58. 
New York:  Lawrence Erlbaum.  Our work with Pierre Rainville (Simon, D., 
Craig, K.D., Gosselin, F., Belin, P., & Rainville, P. (2008).  Recognition and 
discrimination of prototypical dynamic expressions of pain and emotions. Pain, 135, 
55-64.  Simon, D., Craig, K.D., Miltner, W.H.R., & Rainville, P. (2006). Brain 
responses to dynamic facial expressions of pain. Pain, 126, 309-318.) using 
actors trained to simulate pain and a range of emotional displays 
was complicated by the findings we and others have generated 
indicating that there are subtle differences between genuine and 
dissimulated displays and we used a number of training strategies 
and validity checks to overcome the problem.  We did not address the 
issues in detail in the paper submitted, but the basic substance of 
the issues was described, for example, “Control can be achieved over 
facial displays of pain22, including both exaggeration and 
suppression of the display; however, the exaggerated display differs 
from the genuine display in subtle ways52, and neither faking nor 
suppression of facial displays are wholly successful44, 67.” 
 
The second point (“that pain behaviour, including facial expression 
can be divided into protective and communicative behaviours 
(Sullivan and colleagues), or is this distinction not in the 
behaviours but in their interpretation by observers”) was addressed 
in the paper.  For example, the primary paragraph addressing this 
begins with “In considering types of automatic behaviour it is 
useful to distinguish between observable actions that are directly 
protective, because they permit escape or avoidance of sources of 
pain, and those that are indirectly protective because they 
communicate distress to others, thereby eliciting their protective 
interventions80”  We could provide many additional references, 
including those to our own work using the distinction, but reference 
80 effectively covers the field and includes many additional 
references that demonstrate the validity of the distinction.  We 
would argue that the distinction can be made independent of the 
judgment of the observer.   
 
The third point (“that there might be priority processing for 
apparently inauthentic expression by a cheater detection algorithm 
(Williams and colleagues”) lies at the heart of much evolutionary 
biology/psychology theorizing and study in discussion of such topics 
as reciprocal altruism and psychopathic behavior.  We acknowledge 
the point in adding the following statement “Universal propensities 
to detect cheaters have been postulated by evolutionary biologists 
to account for careful scrutiny of others in social13,20,48,49,90”, but 
hesitate to provide a more complete analysis.  Papers referenced do 
provide the extensive analysis.     
 
Final observations, following, have been addressed: 
 
On p 9 I don't understand the sentence: Automatic processing can be 
(Bottom up or stimulus driven processes). What is meant by the brackets 
and underlining? 
 
Reference 7 I think should be to Neuroimage, not NeroImage!  
And reference 15 has an odd format for the date. 
 
 There are additional minor wording changes that improve the 
writing. 
 
 Thank you for the opportunity to revise and resubmit. 
 
Sincerely, 
Ken 
 
Kenneth D. Craig, 
Professor of Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
